Across the globe, leaders are trying to end wars through peace talks — intricate dances choreographed by third parties to gradually swap war for peace. Yet even as scholars have identified many factors that determine the success or failure of a peace process, it is still difficult to predict whether and when a conflict will end through negotiations.
The way a peace agreement is negotiated is just as important as the outcome itself. A peace agreement requires more than just political concessions; it needs to be embraced and sustained by the people who are directly affected by, engaged in, and involved in the conflict. This includes both the insurgents and governments at the bargaining table as well as those who have been displaced by conflict.
To do so, the entire population must be involved in the negotiations and the process of building trust and identifying common goals. Achieving this goal requires a broad set of organizational/institutional components:
These include the negotiation framework, which establishes the conditions under which negotiations take place; legal codification, which limits maneuvering space for one or both parties; and publicity, which increases the likelihood of disaffection among the broader public and provides spoilers with a platform (Kew and Wanis-St. John 2008). The article examines these components and their consequences through two case studies: Colombia and Turkey. In both cases, different negotiation frameworks led to divergent processes and outcomes. For example, in Colombia, a wide range of institutional components, including the legitimacy of mediators and the inclusion of civil society, enabled the successful negotiations between the government and FARC. In Turkey, the lack of these elements largely contributed to the failure of the negotiations between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).